This paper studies the impact of the presence of bankers in the board of a corporation on its capital structure. We assume that the presence of bankers reduces information asymmetry problems, facilitating information transmission between corporations and …nancial institutions. Using a large database on Board of Directors, we construct the directors's social network and measure the relative in ‡uence (centrality) of bankers on the information transmission mechanism. Our results indicate that the presence of bankers in the board increases the leverage ratio in US. This e¤ect is magni…ed by the in ‡uence of the banker, i.e. the more connected a banker is, the higher the leverage ratio of the …rm in which he or she sits. We also show that he e¤ect of banker's social in ‡uence on the leverage ratio increases with …rm's opacity, which is consistent with our interpretation of the role of bankers on the information transmission mechanism.
Introduction
In this paper we examine whether the presence of in ‡uential bankers in the board of a corporation a¤ects or not the capital structure of the …rm. First, we measure the in ‡uential role of the bankers on the network of directors by using social network analysis to compute their centrality on the network. We then examine whether the banker's centrality impacts on the capital structure of a …rm when seating on the board of directors. Modigliani and Miller's (1958) states that capital structure should be irrelevant under a set of assumptions in the sense that the value of a …rm does not depend on the debt-to-equity ratio. Theoretical research and empirical evidence have shown that capital structure is a main determinant of …rm value. Relaxing the assumptions characterizing the MM frictionless economy would become a source of research in Corporate Finance.
Bankruptcy costs [Baxter (1967) , Stiglitz (1972) , Kraus and Litzemberger (1973) , Kim (1978) ], agency costs [Jensen and Meckling (1976) ], and information asymmetry [Ross (1973) , Myers and Majluf (1984) ], have added to the analysis as an o¤setting cost of debt. The trade-o¤ between tax advantages and costs of debt imply that an optimal capital structure may exist. Although Miller (1977) argues that, when adding personal taxes, optimal capital structure exists only at macro level, and not at …rm-level, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that corporate tax shield substitutes (such as depreciation, amortization and investment tax credits) imply "a unique interior optimum leverage decision with or without leverage related costs". Myers (1984) suggests that after setting a target leverage ratio, …rms gradually adjust their capital structure. Diamond (1984) shows that if banks act as "delegated monitors" when lending money to corporations, as suggested by Schumpeter (1939) , informational asymmetries in the …nancial markets are reduced, minimizing the monitoring costs. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) relate increases in availability of credit with bank-…rm relationship. Moreover, banker-directors, i.e. bankers who seat simultaneous on the board of directors of a bank and of a non-…nancial …rm, provide …nancial expertise to management [Mace (1971) , Lorsh and MacIver (1989) ]. The informational advantage of bankers-directors and the ability to discipline management, either by termination or by the changes in the compensation structure is a more e¤ective monitoring mechanism then loan covenants [Williamson (1988) , Kroszner and Strahan(2001) ].
As a result, the presence of banker-directors may reduce the monitoring costs even further [Fama (1985) ], possibly lowering the costs of funds [James (1987) , Berger and Udell (1995) ], specially in the cases where there is higher information asymmetry between insiders and the public …nancial markets [Fama (1985) , Leland and Pyle (1997), Kracaw and Zenner (1998) . Ciammara (2006) shows that, when taking into account the endogeneity, the presence of an a¢ liated banker-director has a positive e¤ect on the …rm leverage. 1 However, creditors on the board have an informational advantage over outside creditors [Leland and Pyle (1997) and Krozner and Straham (2001) ]. Kracaw and Zenner (1998) show evidence of negative price reaction to announcement of loan renewals involving a bank represented on the …rm's board. Using an international sample, Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide evidence that banks extract informational rents from the …rms, by charging higher spreads. 2 Güner et al. (2008) also show that the presence of …nancial experts on the board a¤ect corporate decisions, although not always in the best interest of shareholders. Stecher and Grønnevet (2009) propose a theoretical framework where the creditors'interests protection increases with information asymmetry, board size and proportion of outside directors on the board, providing a more benevolent interpretation of the misconduct of bankers as proposed by Güner et al. (2009) . Similarly, Andersen et al. (2004) …nd that the cost of debt is inversely related to board independence and board size. Raheja (2005) proposes a model where insiders of large boards release more information to outside directors in the periods prior to CEO sucession in order to increase the probability of being nominated CEO. In fact, board size plays a decisive role. On one hand, the probability of having a banker on the board increases with the board size. On the other hand, the number of connections of a director will depend on the board size.
Recent studies show the in ‡uence of individuals'connections on …nancial decisions. Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009) show that politically connected boards can add value to …rms. Fracassi (2008) show that the social network of the management team have an impact on corporate investment decisions, where connected …rms make similar investments. Cohen et al. (2009) show that portfolio managers invest in …rms they are connected through their network. In both cases, pro…tability is higher the more central the managers are on the network.
Both studies argue that the network lower information-gathering costs [Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) ] screening and selecting the important pieces of information [Burt (1997) ].
In this work, we test the role of a banker-director on the information ‡ow that is released to the (credit) market. In the case of a signi…cant role, we also test how the in ‡uence of bankers contributes to the reduction of information asymmetry, reducing monitoring costs and, therefore, impacting on the capital structure of the …rm. Our results indicate that not only the presence of bankers on the board increases the leverage ratio, as found in Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) , but also that this e¤ect is magni…ed by the in ‡uence of the banker. We propose to classify the in ‡uence of bankers by measuring their centrality in the social network of boards and directors: the more directors a banker is linked with, the more information may pass through him, helping to reduce information asymmetry, either by disseminating information or by having a certi…cation role. 3 Consistently with this interpretation, our results indicate that the e¤ect of the banker's social in ‡uence on the leverage ratio increases with …rm opacity, i.e. …rms where information asymmetry is higher. In the presence of other factors which might reduce information asymmetry, e.g. credit rating, the role of the banker's in ‡uence as information transmission mechanism is reduced. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the determinants of capital structure and hypothesize how the presence (and the centrality) of a banker-director may also be considered a capital structure determinant. In Section 3 we describe the data. In Section 4 we explain the methodology, addressing …rstly, the directors'network and the centrality measures used to classify the in ‡uential role of bankers and secondly, the estimation procedures used to correct for a possible endogeneity bias. In Section 5 we present the results. The main conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
Capital Structure Determinants
In this section we start by presenting the known determinants of capital structure, already established in the literature. We will then propose a new determinant, based on the in ‡uence of bankers and their role in the information transmission channels.
Established in the literature
Previous studies show that size, asset tangibility and speci…city, growth opportunities, pro…tability, and median industry leverage are the main determinants of capital structure 4 . We will brie ‡y discussed the theory behind and the variables we used to proxy for each determinant.
Size has a positive impact on leverage. First, larger …rms are usually covered by a higher number of analysts, reducing the information asymmetry. Therefore, when lending to smaller …rms, lenders face relatively higher monitoring costs. This extra cost is passed to the borrower by increasing the interest rate, and hence reducing the leverage. Secondly, bankruptcy costs are …xed and therefore larger …rms have relatively lower bankruptcy costs. This positive relationship is empirically documented in several studies such as Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Schenoy and Koch (1996) , although there is some mixed evidence in the literature as in Titman and 4 For a thorough review of the literature, see Frank and Goyal (2007) .
Wessels (1988).
The pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests a hierarchy in the …nancing mechanism, where in order to reduce information asymmetry costs, …rms favour internal funds over external funds, and among these, …rms favour debt over equity. Therefore, more pro…table …rms will be less leveraged.
This negative relationship is consensual among the empirical literature [Rajan and Zingales (1995) According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , the con ‡ict of interests between debtholders and shareholders may be avoided by allocating collateral debt to speci…c projects. Therefore, …rms with higher levels of tangible assets can have higher leverage, as new debt contracts can use those assets as collateral. Jensen et al. (1992) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) show evidence of a positive relationship between asset tangibility and leverage.
However, Shenoy and Koch (1996) …nd mixed results across industries. This di¤erence in results is due to the asset speci…city and its liquidity if used as collateral. If an (tangible) asset is highly speci…c to the …rm, it might be worthless outside the …rm even if its book value is high, implying a negative relationship between asset speci…city and leverage. Also, some authors …nd mixed results when di¤erentiating between short-term and long-term debt [see Wijst and Thurik (1993) and Chittenden et al. (1996)] According to Myers (1977) growth …rms should use more equity …nance in order to avoid passing up pro…table investments. The same author has suggested the use of the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for future growth opportunities. Therefore, we should expect a negative e¤ect of the market-to-book ratio on the leverage ratio. This theory has mixed evidence on the literature. While Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Hirota (1999) have found the expected negative relationship (for an international and a Japanese sample respectively), Chiarella, Pham and Tan (1992) and Lee, Lee and Lee (2000) show the opposite (for Australian and Korean sample, respectively). 6 2.2 A new capital structure determinant Podolny (1994) shows that social relationships between market agents may prevent market failure due to uncertainty and information asymmetry. Moreover, Burt (1997) shows that a network of social relationships allows people to gather more information about others whom they don't know personally, playing a crucial role in screening and selecting the relevant pieces of information. Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) provide evidence that social networks represent information channels that lower information-gathering costs. Nohria (1992) shows that the creation and maintenance of information ‡ows, usually referred to as "networking", increases one's information, allowing the possible inclusion of private information.
In the same way, we should expect the social relationships of the directors of a …rm to play a role in information transmission, reducing the information asymmetry between agents in the market. Shane and Cable (2002) show the importance of social ties in obtaining venture capital. The authors survey directly a small sample of entrepreneurs classifying the degree of "acquainteness" of seed-stage investors, i.e. how well does each entrepreneur knows each investor before presenting the project. They conclude that the social network of the entrepreneurs has an important role in facilitating credit. However the survey approach is not feasible when analyzing a large numbers of …rms. 5 Our proposal is to use the network of the boards and directors as a proxy for the real social network of market agents. This means that the network we construct only has partial information of the professional relationships between agents, excluding all others relationships, both professional (all non-board related connections) or private (family/friendship ties or common memberships of Universities, clubs). Also, in contrast with Shane and Cable (2002) approach, where qualitative data on the strength of the social relationship is available, we can only observe that two directors sit in the same board at a particular time and assume that those two must know each other and are, therefore, directly connected. 5 The survey included 100 hours of interview for 106 individuals and 50 …rms.
7
Using social network analysis and suitable centrality measures (to be de…ned in Section 4.1), we infer the in ‡uential role of each director. In particular, we are interested in the role of bankers-directors in the information ‡ow, its impact on the reduction of information asymmetries and, as a consequence, its impact on the …rm's capital structure. We focus on the role of bankers because of their privileged access to information during the process of credit concession. If the social network of directors is a good proxy for the real life social network, then we should expect that the presence of banker on the board of …rm may reduce the information asymmetry between …rm and lenders which in turn allows the …rm to increase its leverage. Speci…cally we test the following hypothesis:
The presence of a banker on the board increases the leverage of a …rm, (2005) have already tested for hypothesis 1, i.e. they tested for the mere presence of bankers in boards. In fact, although we test the same hypothesis, our banker and bank classi…cation criteria is di¤erent from the one used in Byrd and Myzruchi (2005) . Firms are categorized as banks if they are listed as "Banks" in Worldscope's Industry Level 3 name. This is a broader de…nition of bank that the one used by Byrd and Myzruchi (2005), which was restricted to commercial banks. Note that this de…nition of "banker-directors" will apply to everyone who is a board member of a …rm that falls into our "bank" criteria. This means that there will be individuals that will be classi…ed as "banker-directors", even if their original background is not the banking industry. 6 However, no study has evaluated the role of banker-directors in the information transmission mechanism.
Byrd and Myzruchi
If it is true that bankers have an important role in the reduction of the information asymmetry, then the more in ‡uential a banker is, the more he will contribute to lessen the information asymmetry between the market and the …rm where he is also a director. Note that we do not need to assume that the banker is 6 Mr. Beattie will be considered a "banker-director" in 2006 because he sits on a bank's Board, in this case the Royal Bank of Canada's Board. Sharing this directorate is Mr. Young, an independent director who sits on the same bank's board since 1991 and was Chairman and CEO of a frozen food company from 1984 to 2001. Nevertheless, if he is central on the network, this is, if he has in ‡uence on the network, he may play an important role in the information transmission regardless of his previous background.
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sharing insider information or any other form of illegal action. It su¢ ces to interpret the banker role in the information transmission mechanism as in Burt (1997) where the network is used as a …lter for the relevant pieces of information: when the market analyses all pieces of available information, it will give more weight to information coming from more in ‡uential sources of information. The more central a banker is on the network, the higher is his ability to use the network to screen and select the relevant information, providing a more reliable signal to the market and reducing information asymmetry. Again, as a reduction in the information asymmetry between …rm and lenders would allow the …rm to increase its leverage, we test for the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The more in ‡uential a banker-director, the higher the leverage of a …rm.
There are other factors that can contribute to better dissemination of information. Firms which are constituents of a major index are more likely to be followed by a higher number of analysts and will have higher media coverage than a smaller capitalization …rm. Firms can also choose to be rated by credit rating agencies. The rating will serve as a certi…cation mechanism, contributing to the reduction of information asymmetry. In these cases, the role of the banker in the information transmission mechanism should be less relevant.
The level of information asymmetry may also be proxied with other …nancial variables. For example, in an e¢ cient market, prices move with the arrival of new information. If there is no information, prices do not change and one does not observe trades. Therefore, one may use a liquidity measure such as Amihud's (2002) to proxy for the level of information asymmetry. Another example would be the accruals quality proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) . Being an estimate of future cash ‡ows, accruals are subjected to estimation error.
Therefore, low quality of the accruals can contribute to higher levels of information asymmetry.
In other words, the higher the information asymmetry is, the more important is the role of an in ‡uential banker for the information transmission mechanism. If the e¤ect of the presence (or the in ‡uence) of a banker-director on the …rm's leverage is in fact due to a reduction in the information asymmetry, then one should expect this e¤ect to be higher in more opaque …rms. We specify this hypothesis as:
The higher the level of information asymmetry, the bigger the impact of the presence (or in ‡uence) of a banker on the leverage of a …rm. and we will refer to the proxies cited above as proxies for …rm opacity.
Data
Our …nal dataset is the result of the merge of two types of data: the …nancial data and the board composition database.
Our data on boards is based on BoardEx reports, which provide information on the interlocks of the boards, When a …rm does not appear on BoardEx reports, it does not necessarily mean that there is no bankerdirector: it may be the case that the …rm is not analyzed by BoardEx. This is evident in Table 1 , which compares the proportion of …rms with banker-directors using the whole WorldScope 7 sample or restricting the sample to …rms for which BoardEx also provides information on board size (only available from 2001 onwards).
The sharp decrease in the proportion of bankers after 2003 may be due to regulatory change. Following the Enron …nancial scandal, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley strongly recommended 8 that bankers should not seat on the board of …rms with whom they also had a lending relationship through the bank. On the other hand, 7 The comprehensive coverage available on Worldscope represents more than 95% of the world's market value. Worldscope includes up to 20 years of historical data on more than 50,000 public and private companies, with up to 1,500 data elements on each company record. 8 The original SOX proposal limited the pool of …nancial expert to CPAs or other professional with direct accounting experience, but the …nal proposal would include bankers. There is a positive relationship between …rm size and board size which is well documented in the literature. and the latter on the di¤erent characteristics of boards in small and large …rms. This positive relationship between …rm and board size is also present in our data.
Our main data source for …nancial variables is Datastream using all the …rms from WorldScope list. Our variable of capital structure is the leverage ratio computed as the ratio of total debt to market capitalization.
We use the logarithm of sales as a measure of size, the ratio of tangible to total assets as a measure of asset tangibility, the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets as a proxy for asset speci…city, market-to-book ratio as the usual growth opportunities measure, ROA as the pro…tability measure. We also use industrial sector dummies (SIC 2-digit level) in order to control for the median industry value.
As for the proxies for …rm opacity, we use Compustat to create two variables indicating if the …rm is rated by S&P or if the …rm belongs to the S&P500 index; we use Joel Hasbrouck's database for the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure 9 and we compute Dechow and Dichev (2002) board. Mr. Beattie, the director we selected before as an example, will be connected to every individual who is also a Thompson's director. In addition, he will also be connected to all Royal Bank of Canada's directors, as he is also a board member in this …rm.
After constructing the network of directors (only), we are able to measure the role of each individual on the ‡ow of information, by computing a centrality measure for each vertex, i.e. each director, on the network. In this work, we will focus on three basic measures of centrality commonly used in information ‡ows /contagion analysis: degree, closeness and betweenness.
The degree of a vertex is the number of connections of a vertex with other vertices of the network.
Formally, the degree k i of vertex i is
where A ij equals 1 if vertex i is connected to vertex j, or 0 otherwise and n is the size of the network, i.e.
the number of vertices in the network. It is usual to normalize this measure by the maximum possible degree (n 1). The normalized measure becomes the so-called degree centrality and is given by
Within the directors network it represents the number of directors with whom a particular individual is related to. A director with higher degree centrality knows more directors inside the network.
2. Closeness centrality (Sabidussi 1965 ) is the inverse of the average distance from a particular vertex to every other vertex. More formally, the closeness centrality C i of vertex i is:
where d G (i; j) represents the geodesic distance between i and j, i.e. the length of the shortest path between the two vertices. Within the directors network, it represents the average number of contacts that a director would have to make in order to reach any other director on the network. As there are directors which are isolated/separated from part of the network, the classical de…nition of closeness is not well de…ned. The solution for these cases, is to use the in ‡uential range of each director, i.e. to measure the centrality within the reachable component of the network (Lin 1976 ) as a ratio of the total number of vertices,
where J i is the size of the network component of vertex i. A director with higher closeness centrality will need on average less intermediaries to reach any other director.
3. Betweenness centrality for a given vertex i is de…ned (Freeman 1977 ) as follows. Let g jk denote the number of the shortest paths connecting vertices j and k, and g jk (i) denote the number of the subset of those shortest paths that also pass through vertex i. The betweenness centrality B i of vertex i is
The ratio
can be interpreted as the probability that director i is a vehicle of information transfer between director k and director j, assuming that all shortest paths are equally likely to be used.
After calculating the centrality measures of each individual in the directors' network, we aggregate the centrality measures to the …rm level. As we are interested in the information role of bankers-directors, we only use these individuals for aggregation purposes: for each …rm, the corresponding centrality measure is the maximum value of the banker-director in the board. If there is no banker-director, the centrality measure is 0 10 .
Estimation
We will test our hypothesis 1 and 2 by running the following regression equation where the dependent variable, LR t+1 is the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio total debt to market capitalization, Size is measured by the logarithm of sales, Pro…tability is measured by return on assets, Asset Tangibility is measured as the ratio of tangible to total assets, Asset Speci…city is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets, Growth_Opportunities are measured with market-to-book ratios. Banker may denote either the presence of banker on the board (hypothesis 1)or one of the three banker-director centrality measures (hypothesis 2). We also control for median industry level (using 2 digit SIC codes) and year e¤ects. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. To test hypothesis 3, we will add an extra term, interacting the centrality measure variable with one of the …rm's opacity proxies.
We need to correct for possible endogeneity bias when testing for our hypothesis that bankers-directors 
where X i is a set of (observable) variables known to in ‡uence the outcome and " i N (0; " ): The observable outcome y i is
If selection into treatment does not depend on the outcome y i ; we can estimate the average treatment e¤ect by OLS, provided that, apart from regressors exogeneity, the usual OLS assumptions hold.
In our case, y i is the leverage ratio de…ned as However, …rms simultaneously choose the capital structure and Board composition, which implies that d i is correlated with " i and
leading for the inconsistency of the OLS estimator. 11 This means that, in spite the IV approach being correct for measuring the impact of bankers centrality on the capital structure, the same is not true when measuring the impact of the mere presence of a bankerdirector. The latter is methodologically equivalent to evaluating the impact of a treatment on a variable of interest, where selection into treatment is endogenous. We will use Rosenbaum and Rubin's (1984) Average Treatment E¤ects (ATE) approach where selection into treatment is model as an index function dependent on a set of instruments.
The main instrument will be the size of the board, this is, the total number of directors on each board. The larger the number of directors on the board, the higher the probability that one of the directors also sits at a bank. However we do not expect the board size itself to impact on the leverage ratio of the …rm. When using the centrality measures under the IV approach, board size will also be an obvious instrument as the centrality measures of the directors are, by construction, dependent of the original board size. Remember that we constructed the network of directors, by projecting the original (2-mode) network, with boards and directors, onto a network of only directors, where directors are connected if they share the same board. Therefore, larger boards will automatically increase the number of connections between the directors seating on those boards.
In addition, we also use the three-year averages 12 of the leverage ratio, its determinants (excluding the new proposed one) and volatility as instruments. All instruments are lagged one period. This means that for leverage ratio at t + 1; the regressors are at time t, number of directors in board is at time t 1, and the three/year averages are calculated using times t 1, t 2 and t 3:
5 Results Table 3 reports the regression results. Column 1-6 are the OLS regressions. When restricting the speci…cation to the capital structure determinants already established in the literature (column 1), all coe¢ cients have the expected sign and are highly signi…cant. However both the presence (column 2) and the di¤erent in ‡uence measure of bankers (columns 3-6) are statistically insigni…cant. When correcting for endogeneity, the results are the opposite. Using the average treatment e¤ects approach (column7), we conclude that the presence of bankers in the board of the …rms a¤ects the leverage ratio (hypothesis 1): on average, the mere presence of a banker on the board of a …rm increases the leverage ratio by 0:2.
The magnitude of this e¤ect increases with the banker's in ‡uence on the network (hypothesis 2), independent of which centrality measure we use (columns 7-11): on average, the higher the banker's in ‡uence, the stronger is his/her impact on the leverage ratio of the …rm. Note that, apart from the size coe¢ cient, the coe¢ cients of the previously documented capital structure determinants continue to have the expected sign. The size coe¢ cient becomes negative although not always statistically signi…cant (columns 7-11). This suggests that there must be some …rm characteristic that is related to both size and the centrality measure that is not captured by the other control variables.
In Table 4 , we include interactions variables between degree centrality and each of the …rm's opacity proxy presented before. The results are consistent with our interpretation that the presence of a banker in the …rm reduces the information asymmetry. The impact of the banker's in ‡uence on the leverage ratio increases with …rm opacity, i.e. the e¤ect is weaker when other information asymmetry reduction mechanism is present.
Bigger …rms, being strongly scrutinized by analysts and media, are less subjected to information asymmetry problems, which reduces the impact of banker's in ‡uence (column3). So do …rms with higher levels of tangible assets. By being able to pledge more assets as collateral, these …rms can provide better signals to the market.
Our results con…rm this hypothesis, as the impact of the banker's social in ‡uence on leverage decreases with higher levels tangible to total assets ratio (collumn4). When using Amihud's illiquidity measure as a proxy for …rm opacity (column 7), we reach the same conclusion. Accruals quality increase with …rm's opacity as they represent better estimates of future earnings, but again the results go in the same direction: the e¤ect of the banker's social in ‡uence on leverage increases with accruals quality (column8). Lastly, the same e¤ect is lower for …rms which are rated or belong to the S&P500 index (column 5 and 6, respectively). By providing certi…cation, credit rating …rms reduce the uncertainty of the signal and therefore the role of the banker on the information transmission mechanism is reduced. Regarding …rms belonging to an index, the interpretation is the same as when using …rm size interaction to proxy information asymmetry. In both cases where we classify …rm's opacity with a binary variable, the e¤ect of the interaction term practically cancels the e¤ect of the bankers in ‡uence, yielding a total e¤ect close to zero. Table 5 presents the evolution of the estimated impact of the presence and in ‡uence of the banker on the leverage ratio when using just one year of data or dividing the sample in pre and post SOX years. Although the e¤ect of the presence of a banker is signi…cant and positive throughout the sample years, the impact of the centrality measure is not always signi…cant nor with the same sign as when using the whole sample. We These results are robust for changes in the aggregation criteria (sum of individual bankers centrality measure), the dependent variable (book value leverage ratio) and banker de…nition (using SIC …nancial sector classi…cation (2-digit SIC 2 [60; 70)).
Conclusion
Our results show the impact of bankers-directors on the capital structure of …rms. After correcting for endogeneity, the presence of a banker-director signi…cantly increases the leverage ratio of US …rms. Moreover, this impact is stronger the higher the centrality of the banker on the directorship network. This suggests that bankers-directors have an essential role in the dissemination of information in the US market. The more central a banker is on the network, e.g. the more connected the banker is to other directors, the more in ‡uence he has on the information transmission, reducing information asymmetries between the …rm and the credit market, consequently allowing for higher levels of leverage. This impact on the leverage ratio is reduced for less opaque …rms, sustaining our interpretation of the role of bankers-directors as an information asymmetry reduction mechanism. Table 3 We will test our hypothesis 1 and 2 by running the following regression
where the dependent variable, LR t+1 is the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio total debt to market capitalization, SIZE is measured by the logarithm of sales, ROA denotes Profitability and is measured by return on assets, TANG denotes Asset Tangibility and is measured as the ratio of tangible to total assets, R&D RATIO denotes Asset Specificity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets, log MARKET-TO-BOOK denotes Growth Opportunities and is measured as the logarithm of market-to-book ratios. BANKER may denote either the presence of banker on the board (hypothesis 1) or one of the banker-director's influence (centrality) measures (hypothesis 2). We also control for median industry level (using 2 digit SIC codes) and year effects. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Columns 1-6, column 7 and columns 8-11 present OLS, average treatment effects results and IV results, respectively. Clustered Standard errors (firm level). LRt+1,i = β0 + β1SIZEt,i + β2ROAt,i + β3TANGt,i + β4 R&D RATIO t,i + β5 log MARKET-TO-BOOKt,i +δ1DEGREEt,i + δ2DEGREEt,i×OPACITYt,i
where the dependent variable, LRt+1, is the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio total debt to market capitalization, SIZE is measured by the logarithm of sales, ROA denotes Profitability and is measured by return on assets, TANG denotes Asset Tangibility and is measured as the ratio of tangible to total assets, R&D RATIO denotes Asset Specificity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets, log MARKET-TO-BOOK denotes Growth Opportunities and is measured as the logarithm of market-to-book ratios. DEGREE is the degree centrality measure. We add an interaction term between degree centrality and a proxy for the firm's opacity, denoted by OPPACITY. RATING and SP500 denote indicator variables for the rated firms and SP500 consitituents, respectively. ILLIQUIDITY denotes Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure. AQ denotes Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality measure. Controls include sector (2 digit SIC) and year dummies. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Clustered Standard errors (firm level). t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 LRt+1,i = β0 + β1SIZEt,i + β2ROAt,i + β3TANGt,i + β4 R&D RATIO t,i + β5 log MARKET-TO-BOOKt,i + δBANKERt,i
Columns represent samples of specific years or the pre and post Sarbannes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods available on data.
